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MALTHUS, THOMAS ROBERT 
(1766 - 1834) 
 
Thomas Robert Malthus was born in Wotton, Surrey, the son 
of a country gentleman. He was educated at Cambridge 
where he was exposed to Scottish experimental 
Newtonianism in epistemology, Anglican consequentialist 
voluntarism in ethics, and “philosophical Whiggism” in 
politics. After graduation he took orders and was elected a 
fellow of Jesus College.  He carried out his pastoral duties as 
a curate in a small village in Surrey, until in 1805 he was 
offered a professorship of modern history and political 
economy at the “East India College” at Haileybury, 
Hertfordshire , an institution designed to prepare officials for 
the East India Company. He lived there during the following 
three decades while visiting London regularly to attend 
meetings of the Political Economy Club and to have breakfast 
with his friend David Ricardo, with whom he discussed 
economic issues.  
Malthus is important in the history of Utilitarianism 
as the discoverer of the principle of population, which 
became one of the basic weapons in the philosophic 
radicals’s battery.  In 1798 he published Essay on the 
Principle of Population, aimed at fighting utopian egalitarian 
doctrines, such as those formulated by Condorcet and 
William Godwin, by proving that a “principle” according to 
which population increases faster than the means of 
subsistence would doom every attempt at implementing 
social egalitarianism to failure. The pamphlet was 
condemned on moral grounds by both humanitarian Tories 
and evangelical Christians, while it was welcome to Whigs 
and was later included in the philosophic radicals’s canon. A 
new, much expanded version, slightly less dismal in its 
conclusions, was published in 1803 (1989a). 
 A remarkable and yet overlooked feature of the 1803 
version of the Essay is that it presents a doctrine that is more 
empirical and yet no less moral and theological. In fact, the 
problem of theodicy was settled in the two final heterodox 
chapters to the Essay in 1798 in a strongly pessimist tone, but 
it is dealt with in the second version in more optimist tones 
made possible by admission of a wider scope for moral 
choice and responsible action. In more detail the 1803 
version argues a theological consequentialist justification for 
moral laws in general, and for the duty of “moral restraint” in 
particular, and conclude that there is a duty of to defer 
marriage while observing chastity as the remedy to the effects 
of the principle of population.  But, under friendly fire from 
his evangelical fellow-travellers, in the following four 
editions Malthus increasingly modified his doctrines, 
admitting of the possibility that in a decent society the effects 
of the principle might be postponed indefinitely and it would 
be possible “to improve the condition and increase the 
happiness of the lower classes of society” (1989a, vol. 2, p. 
251).  
 The revised version of the population theory was 
inspired by (and in turn provided a source of inspiration for) 
social evangelicalism as theorized and practised by the 
Scottish Presbyterian Thomas Chalmers and the Anglican 
John B. Sumner.  Ironically, while adopting a condescending 
attitude towards “Parson Malthus”, philosophic radicals like 
James Mill tended to stick to the original version of the 
principle of population (by then refuted by Malthus) as an 
essential ingredient in their own socio-political alchemy. 
 This story is complicated enough to account for 
subsequent ambivalent and self-contradictory mythologies 
concerning Malthus’s relationship to Utilitarianism.  In fact, 
starting with the last decades of the nineteenth-century, 
Malthus was believed to have been a utilitarian tout-court 
(see Bonar, 1885).  However, the Benthamites, while 
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gratefully accepting the principle of population, had taken 
Malthus’s mention of “laws of nature”, “virtue”, and natural 
“rights”, as a proof of his being a nonsense-preaching parson.  
Bonar’s view was routinely repeated for almost a century, but 
without questioning its apparent contradictions.  More 
recently, the contrast between the utilitarian Malthus and the 
Christian moralist Malthus has re-emerged in an exchange 
between Hollander (1989) and Winch (1993).  
There are a number of problems with the standard 
interpretation.  How could Malthus, who had no relationship 
to Bentham and a troubled one with James Mill, and at times 
was the target of campaigns planned by Mill himself against 
the enemies of true political economy and opponents of 
political Reform, be nonetheless a utilitarian?  One important 
circumstance is that in the first three decades of the 
nineteenth-century Whigs and Radicals often found 
themselves in alliance, even though their respective political 
agendas differed in important ways.  The principle of utility 
was an ingredient – albeit with a rather different function – in 
two different systems, namely Paley’s consequentialist 
voluntarism (generally known under the infelicitous label 
“theological utilitarianism”) and Bentham’s secular brand of 
Utilitarianism and, in so far as at least the English – as 
contrasted with the Scottish – branch of Whiggism had Paley 
as its authority both currents were dimly perceived as the 
proponents of rather similar ideas. The cleavage emerged in 
full when, on the one hand, an inductivist approach to the 
“noble science of politics” was vindicated against the 
Benthamite deductive approach by Macaulay in a memorable 
series of essays in the Edinburgh Review of 1829 (Lively and 
Rees, 1978) and, on the other hand, Paley’s authority came to 
be challenged from within the Anglican liberal camp by 
supporters of an intuitionist alternative.  
Within this context Malthus had already been 
arguing for some time for an alternative to what Macaulay 
would name utilitarian logic, while adhering (in a manner 
made increasingly milder by growing doses of 
evangelicalism) to a Paley-like ethical doctrine that made 
moral imperatives dependent on the divine will, but also 
assumed that the latter was enlightened by consequentialist 
calculations. In fact, Malthus  frequently proposed “utility” as 
the test for moral laws on the grounds that the greatest sum of 
happiness for his creatures was the Creator’s putative goal 
(1986, p. 77; 1989a, vol. 1, p.19; vol. 2, pp. 104, 157-8).  At 
the same time, he often refers in the Essay to “fixed laws of 
our nature” (1986, pp.8, 59; 1989a, vol. 1, p.10; vol. 2, pp.87-
8) with reference to the basic postulates of his population 
doctrine, and, in the Principles of Political Economy (1820), 
besides “general laws” and the usual “propositions of 
political economy”, he refers to “laws of nature” in the sense 
of laws of physical nature constantly at work “in the 
production of necessaries” (1989b, vol. 1, pp.147-8).  It is 
apparent, therefore, that Malthus’ system of ideas made room 
both for the “test of utility” and for such notions as natural or 
innate “rights” and “laws of nature” that were believed by 
Bentham to be a nonsense.  
The claim that Malthus was a “utilitarian” is, 
accordingly, either vacuous or wrong. If making use of the 
utility principle is what makes one a utilitarian, then clearly 
Malthus could be described as such.  However, if being a 
utilitarian means sharing the family of doctrines taught by the 
Benthamites, then clearly Malthus was not a utilitarian.  He 
was a follower of consequentialist voluntarism, which – far 
from being a not yet fully secular utilitarianism – was a self-
standing doctrine with its own logic and its own waterproof, 
albeit unsavoury, theodicy justifying partial evil in the name 
of universal good.  The mercilessness of such a solution and 
its social implications was the target of evangelical attacks 
and the occasion for repeated amendments to the Essay. The 
final result was that by the third decade of the nineteenth 
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century the Benthamites appeared to be the main supporters 
of a merciless social politics, while the former “ogre” 
Malthus had determined that the goal of any wise and just 
politics was to bring about circumstances which would tend 
to elevate the “character” of the “lower classes”, so that their 
members would no more “acquiesce patiently in the thought 
of depriving themselves and their children of the means of 
being respectable, virtuous and happy” (1989b, vol. 1, p.251).  
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